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Abstract 
Medicare is the largest single program providing explicit support for graduate medical 
education (GME) in the United States, funding about 20% of all direct medical education 
(DGME) costs. However, Medicare also enforces a time-invariant, hospital-specific cap 
on the number of residents it supports per year. Despite the enormous public investment 
in graduate medical education, previous research has not addressed how Medicare’s 
DGME funding caps affect the number of residents per hospital, the general healthcare 
workforce, or healthcare quality.  Exploiting a policy stipulation from the Affordable 
Care and Patient Protection Act, this paper examines the effect of Medicare-funded 
DGME on 1) the supply of medical residents, physicians, and physician assistants at the 
county level and 2) the quality of healthcare provision at the hospital level. The results 
suggest that an increased DGME funding cap is correlated with an increase in the county-
level number of residents, but with a two-year lag from the date of the cap increase. The 
number of primary care residents is significantly higher beginning three years after the 
initial cap increase, and the number of nurse practitioners shows a significant increase 
four years after the cap is raised. Within the first five years after a cap increase, no 
significant change was detected in the county-level supply of physicians. No significant 
change in quality was detected at the hospital level. 
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Introduction 
 Graduate medical education, or GME, “provides the clinical training required for 
a physician to be eligible for licensure and board certification to practice medicine 
independently in the United States” (United States Government Accountability Office 
2018). Medicare is the largest single program providing explicit support for GME in the 
United States, funding about 20% of all direct medical education (DGME) costs. DGME 
costs include medical residents’ stipends and benefits, teaching physicians’ salaries, 
accreditation fees, educational space, and related overhead expenses.  
It is the responsibility of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
to interpret the laws passed by Congress regarding GME funding, and to write and 
enforce regulations for DGME. CMS does not, however, have an obligation to analyze 
GME outcomes or “support the development and maintenance of a rational cost-effective 
new physician workforce” (Sanner & Voorhees 2017). Despite the enormous public 
investment in graduate medical education, there is a lack of research investigating how 
DGME funding affects the number of medical residents, the general healthcare 
workforce, or healthcare quality.  
This paper analyzes the effects DGME funding using Section 5503 of Affordable 
Care and Patient Protection Act, which redistributed 726 Medicare funding slots in 2011. 
Under Section 5503, some hospitals that initially qualified to receive a DGME cap 
increase received no additional slots because the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) “ran out” before reaching the lowest-priority eligible states. These 
hospitals (or the counties they reside in) serve as the control group for hospitals that did 
receive a DGME cap increase in a difference-in-differences analysis. An event-study 
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approach addresses possible lags in the effect of the cap increase, estimating the 
difference-in-differences coefficient separately for each of the first four to five years after 
the implementation of Section 5503. 
The results suggest that an increased DGME funding cap is correlated with an 
increase in the county-level number of residents, but with a two-year lag from the date of 
the cap increase. The number of primary care residents is significantly higher beginning 
three years after the initial cap increase, and the number of nurse practitioners shows a 
significant increase four years after the cap is raised. Within the first five years after a cap 
increase, no significant change was detected in the county-level supply of physicians. No 
significant change in quality was detected at the hospital level. 
Institutional Background 
Federal funding for graduate medical education began with the establishment of 
Medicare in 1965 (Rich et al 2002). Acknowledging the need to support medical 
education as well as patient care, and anticipating that the introduction of both Medicaid 
and Medicare would cause an increase in the demand for medical services, the 
Committee on Ways and Means declared that “until the community undertakes to bear 
such education cost in some other way, that a part of the net cost of such 
activities  [graduate medical education] (including stipends of trainees, as well as 
compensation of teachers and other costs) should be borne to an appropriate extent by the 
hospital insurance program” (Rich et al 2002; Young & Coffman 1998). Quickly, 
Medicare became the largest single source of funding for GME in the United States 
(Young & Coffman 1998). 
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 In 1972, in an effort to slow the growth of Medicare spending, Congress 
implemented prospective limits on hospital costs reimbursed by Medicare (Rich et al 
2002; Young & Coffman 1998).  However, the policy was amended in 1979 so that no 
direct costs of GME programs would count towards this limit (Rich et al 2002; Young & 
Coffman 1998). The next year, reimbursement limits on teaching hospitals were 
increased to reflect the higher operating costs associated with treating patients in those 
hospitals (Rich et al 2002; Young & Coffman 1998). 
In 1984, GME funding switched from a retrospective cost-based reimbursement 
system, under which Medicare reimbursed hospitals for their actual expenditures in a 
given year, to a prospective payment system, under which Medicare used a formula that 
allocated funding to hospitals based on costs incurred in a base year period (for most 
hospitals fiscal year 1984) divided by the number of residents counted in the base year 
(Rich et al 2002; Young & Coffman 1998). Under the prospective payment system, a 
hospital’s Medicare reimbursement funds in a given year were no longer tied to actual 
incurred costs in that same year (Rich et al 2002; Young & Coffman 1998). 
In addition to direct medical education costs, Medicare provides funding for the 
costs of indirect medical education (IME), expenses related to the higher marginal cost of 
treating a patient in a teaching hospital compared to a non-teaching hospital. Among 
other factors, IME funding is intended to adjust for the greater severity of illness 
associated with patients in teaching hospitals, increased inefficiencies in teaching, and 
greater concentration of technology (Rich et al 2002). However, the magnitude of the 
IME adjustment has been controversial since its inception (Rich et al 2002). Since the 
formula for IME payment relies on the ratio of medical residents to hospital beds, and a 
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higher IME payment can result in millions of additional dollars in funding, Congress 
became concerned that it had inadvertently created an incentive for hospitals to take as 
many medical residents as possible in order to increase their resident-to-bed ratio and 
secure more Medicare funding (United States Government Accountability Office 2018) 
To address this concern, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 introduced a hospital-
specific cap on the number of medical residents that Medicare would financially support 
each year (United States Government Accountability Office 2018). The cap was set at 
each hospital’s number of residents in 1996; any hospital may train additional residents 
above its cap, but the hospital will not receive additional Medicare payments for those 
trainees (Eden 2014). The caps do not change over time and make no adjustments for 
changes in the demography of the U.S. population (Eden 2014). Eden (2014) points out 
that, “as a result, the highest density of Medicare-supported slots and Medicare GME 
funding remains in the Northeast.” Residency caps for new teaching hospitals, or for new 
residency programs at existing teaching hospitals, are set at the highest number of FTE 
residents the program trains in any one of its first five years.  
In 2015, Medicare spent over 10 billion dollars on graduate medical education 
(United States Government Accountability Office 2018). However, Chen et al (2013) 
point out that “despite the size of GME investment in the physician workforce, there is 
little accountability for how these public investments affect workforce outcomes, such as 
specialty and geographic distribution.”  The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) does not collect information to assess the outputs or outcomes of GME funding 
related to healthcare workforce planning (United States Government Accountability 
Office, 2018). 
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Section 5503 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, passed in 2010, 
attempted to achieve a more efficient distribution of Medicare-funded residency slots by 
reducing the GME cap for hospitals whose number of trainees fell below the official cap 
for the three most recent cost reporting periods. Hospitals with unused spots were eligible 
to lose 65 percent of the difference between the resident cap (determined by Medicare in 
1997) and the resident count (determined from three most recent cost reports). For 
example, if a hospital had a resident cap of 20 full-time equivalent (FTE) residents, but 
only trained 9 residents during the three most recent cost reporting periods, then this 
hospital would be eligible for a cap reduction of 7 slots. As a result of this reduction, 
CMS could then increase the residency cap at other hospitals by a total of no more than 7 
slots. 
In total, 726 graduate medical education slots were redistributed to 58 hospitals 
under Section 5503 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  The 2011 
residency redistribution was not unprecedented. The Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 redistributed nearly 3,000 residency 
positions, increasing the cap at 304 hospitals in 2005. Two key policy goals of this 
redistribution were to train more residents in primary care and rural areas. However, a 
2013 analysis of the impacts of this redistribution found that the policy failed to meet 
these goals. The analysis used data from the CMS Healthcare Cost Report Information 
System on residency caps, total number of residents trained, number of primary care and 
obstetrics and gynecology physicians trained, and number of all other residents trained 
from 1998 to 2008 (Chen et al 2015). The authors found that only 12 out of 304 hospitals 
receiving additional spots were rural, and they received fewer than 3 percent of 
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redistributed slots. Furthermore, the relative growth of non-primary care training as a 
result of the policy was twice as large as the growth of primary care training. 
Literature Review  
 To date, no analysis has been conducted on the effect of residency redistribution 
on hospital quality. There is some literature supporting the hypothesis that an increase in 
the number of medical residents in a given hospital may lead to an increase in quality of 
care.  Zallman et al (2010) used data from 33,900 hospital-based outpatient visits from 
the 1997-2004 National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NHAMCS) in order 
to assess the quality of US primary care delivered by resident and staff physicians. This 
study examined 20 measures of primary care quality and compared resident and staff 
physician performance on 19 quality indicators, controlling for patient sex, age, 
race/ethnicity, insurance, and metropolitan status. On 4 of these 19 quality indicators—
ACE inhibitor use for congestive heart failure, diuretic use for hypertension, statin 
use for hyperlipidemia, and routine blood pressure screening—residents outperformed 
staff physicians; on the remaining 15 indicators, performance was similar between the 
two groups. 
In a literature review of 23 studies comparing quality of care in teaching versus 
non-teaching hospitals, Kupersmith (2005) found that most studies showed quality of 
inpatient care to be higher in teaching hospitals than in nonteaching hospitals. In 
evaluations of both process measures and outcome measures, teaching hospitals 
outperformed nonteaching hospitals. These findings extend over a range of locations, 
conditions, and populations, and persist when examining both highly specialized and 
routine care.  A limitation of this research is that studies on quality of care are “by their 
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nature observational, usually retrospective, and usually characterized by nonrandom 
selection” (Kupersmith 2005). The Kupersmith analysis does not identify the causes of 
the quality disparity between teaching and non-teaching hospitals; however, in 
conjunction with the research on resident quality of care by Zallman et al, this literature 
review provides additional support for a positive correlation between number of medical 
residents and hospital quality.  
Additionally, no analysis has been conducted on the effect of residency cap 
increases on the local healthcare workforce. Previous research has indicated that 
physician assistants and nurse practitioners may serve as substitutes for physician 
residents in teaching hospitals, suggesting that an increase in medical residents may lead 
to a decrease in the number of physician assistants and nurse practitioners (Riportella-
Muller et al 1995). A 14-month long observational study of nurse practitioners, physician 
assistants, and medical resident care activities found that “the tasks and activities 
performed by acute care nurse practitioners and physician assistants are similar to those 
performed by resident physicians” (Rudy et al 1998). Patient outcomes were similar for 
nurse practitioners and physician assistants when compared to resident physicians; 
however, medical residents treated patients who were sicker and older on average. 
Another important aspect of the relationship between GME funding and the 
healthcare workforce is the effect of a physician’s geographic location during her 
residency program on her long-term practice location. Increasing severity of rural 
physician shortages over the past 20 years have drawn attention to the study of “pipeline” 
programs designed to retain physicians in rural areas after completing their GME (Brooks 
et al 2002). However, there has been a lack of academic research on general patterns of 
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correlation between the geographic location of a physician’s medical residency and first 
practice. 
There is some evidence that physicians’ first practice sites are influenced by the 
geographic location of their medical residencies. In a sample of 2,612 physicians, Dorner, 
Burr, and Tucker (1991) found that 40% of physicians’ first practices were located less 
than 10 miles from their residencies, and over 50% were within 75 miles.  Another 
survey of 358 graduate physicians by West et al (1996) found that nearly two thirds of 
family physicians stay in their first practice location until retirement.  They also found 
that primary care physicians moved significantly shorter distances than did those from 
other specialties. Steele et al (1998) found in a survey of 441 physicians that 43% chose 
to practice in the same city or metropolitan area in which they trained, and 46% of those 
who stayed nearby had no personal tie to the area before their residency. Using data from 
the American Medical Association Physician Masterfile, Seifer, Vranizan, and Grumbach 
(1995) found wide variation among states in the proportion of physicians who remained 
in the same state where they completed their residency; however, they did note that 
primary care physicians were nine percentage points more likely than specialists to 
remain in their state of GME. These studies support the hypothesis that an increased 
number of GME slots at a given hospital may cause a corresponding increase in the 
number of physicians practicing in the local area, beginning as soon as three years (the 
shortest period of medical residency) after the implementation of the slot increase. 
Data 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services and HUD Administrative Data 
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The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) website contains 
publicly-available information regarding which hospitals experienced cap increases, 
which hospitals experienced cap decreases, the size of each increase/decrease, and which 
states had hospitals that were eligible but did not receive additional funding under 
Section 5503. The primary CMS document on Section 5503 GME redistribution 
identifies hospitals using a Provider ID number, which was matched to information about 
the hospital’s name and address using the CMS “Hospital General Information” database. 
From there, hospitals were matched to their FIPS county code using a ZIP-FIPS 
crosswalk available from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 
Robert Graham Center GME Tables/ CMS Cost Reports 
Yearly data on the number of FTE and primary care FTE residents per hospital is 
drawn from the Robert Graham Center, which originally sources its data from the CMS 
cost reports. In order to receive DME and IME payment from CMS, a hospital must 
supply CMS with an annual fiscal cost report. The annual cost report is sent to an 
intermediary agency that reviews the initial report, and then it is submitted to CMS. The 
information may then be audited by CMS approved financial auditors. Due to audits and 
reconciliation of reports, any values that are three years old or newer are still subject to 
change. For this reason, only FTE counts through 2015 are included in this paper’s 
analyses. 
Area Health Resource File 
The Area Health Resource File (AHRF) combines information from over 50 data 
sources to provide county-level information (using FIPS county codes) on a variety of 
health care utilization, health professions and facilities, environmental, and socio-
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demographic topics. In this paper, the AHRF is utilized to estimate outcome variable 
related to the healthcare workforce: namely, number of physicians and physician 
assistants in a given county and year. The AHRF is also the source of demographic 
covariates such as population size, racial composition, and average education level. 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services Hospital Compare 
The Hospital Compare database contains information on readmissions, mortality, 
and patient satisfaction surveys from 2007-2016. This database uses the same Provider 
ID as the CMS administrative data on Section 5503, allowing for a direct comparison 
between hospitals that did and did not receive cap increases.  Readmissions and mortality 
measures in the Hospital Compare data focus on three conditions: acute myocardial 
infection (AMI), heart failure (HF), and pneumonia (PN). Patient satisfaction ratings 
from the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems 
(HCAHPS). 
Methods 
Identification strategy 
Section 5503 of the Affordable Care Act mandated the redistribution of over 700 
DGME funding slots. This redistribution was accomplished by lowering the Medicare-
funded DGME cap at hospitals that had trained fewer than the maximum allowable 
number of residents during each of the previous three years. These “excess” spots were 
awarded to hospitals in states that met one of the following criteria:  
1. The hospital is located in a state with a resident-to-population ratio in the lowest 
quartile: Montana, Idaho, Alaska, Wyoming, South Dakota, Nevada, North 
Dakota, Mississippi, Indiana, Puerto Rico, Florida, Georgia, or Arizona 
11 
 
2. The hospital is located in a rural area 
3. The hospital is located in one of the 10 states with the highest proportion of its 
population living in a health professional shortage area: Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Puerto Rico, New Mexico, South Dakota, the District of Columbia, Montana, 
North Dakota, Wyoming, or Alabama 
70 percent of slots were reserved for hospitals meeting criteria 1, while the remaining 30 
percent of unused spots were allocated to hospitals meeting criteria 2 or 3. 
 Despite these restrictions on which hospitals were allowed to apply for additional 
DGME slots, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services announced in 2012 that the 
agency had “ran out of slots during the redistribution process and were unable to award 
any slots to hospitals in qualifying, but lower ranking, States.” Two hospitals that applied 
and qualified for slots in Florida (which is ranked 11th under criteria 1) did not receive 
any additional funding. No slots were awarded to seven Georgia hospitals (Georgia is 
ranked 12th under criteria 1) or eight Arizona hospitals (Arizona is ranked 13th under 
criteria 1) that applied because all available slots were already granted to hospitals in 
states ranked 1 through 11.  Additionally, one hospital in Alabama (which is ranked 10th 
under criteria 3) did not receive any of the slots that it was qualified to receive. 
 This paper uses hospitals/counties in three states that were eligible to receive 
additional funding under criteria 1-3, but where CMS “ran out of slots”- Florida, Arizona, 
and Alabama- as a control group for the hospitals/counties that received a DGME cap 
increase of 5 or more slots. Georgia was excluded from the analysis due to a state GME 
expansion initiative that began in 2013. 
Sample selection 
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Selection of the treatment group began with the list of 58 hospital provider 
numbers listed by CMS in the public document announcing hospitals that would receive 
increased GME funding under Section 5503. These provider numbers were matched with 
each hospital’s ZIP code using the “Hospital General Information” dataset, and finally to 
a FIPS code using the HUD ZIP-FIPS crosswalk (or manual matching when necessary). 
Since some hospitals received such a small cap increase under Section 5503 that they 
were under nearly the same conditions as the control group, a treatment intensity cutoff 
was established for inclusion in the treatment group. A county was included in the 
treatment group if the sum of DGME cap increases for all hospitals in that county was 
greater than five slots. Although some DGME slots were redistributed to hospitals in 
Puerto Rico, AHRF did not include data on those geographic areas, and thus they were 
excluded from the analysis. In total, 24 counties from 11 states were included in the 
treatment group for county-level outcomes, and 34 hospitals were included in the 
treatment group for quality outcomes.  
 The control group was selected from hospitals that reported receiving some 
graduate medical education funding from Medicare, as documented on their CMS cost 
reports. First, the group was limited to hospitals in Florida, Arizona, and Alabama.  Using 
the same matching process as for the treatment group, these hospitals were then paired 
with their FIPS codes, and counties were eliminated from the control group if they 
already contained a treatment hospital.  Two counties were also excluded from the 
control group because they contained hospitals who received extra DGME spots in 2012 
under another policy, section 5506 (redistribution of slots from closed hospitals). 
Fourteen counties were included in the control group for county-level outcomes, and 65 
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FIGURE I: PARALLEL TRENDS IN FTE RESIDENTS 
hospitals were included in the control group for quality outcomes. 
In order to confirm that the cap increases declared by CMS truly aligned with the 
funding constraints experienced by hospitals in the sample, Figure I below plot the 
average number of full-time-equivalent residents in treatment versus control hospitals. 
The increased slope for treatment hospitals after 2011 indicates that treatment hospitals 
did in fact increase their number of graduate medical residents in response to the Section 
5503 cap redistribution; a similar increase was not observed among the control hospitals.  
Empirical strategy 
This paper uses a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effect of 
Medicare-funded graduate medical education on the number of medical residents and 
healthcare quality, both measured at the hospital level, and on the supply of healthcare 
professionals, measured at the county level. For each outcome of interest, the effect of 
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increased DGME funding (if it exists) will likely amplify over time for two reasons: 
hospitals may take several years to expand their residency program to reach the new caps, 
and each additional resident who does choose to practice in the county of their residency 
must train for a minimum of three years before becoming a licensed physician. An event 
study framework is utilized to incorporate this feature of the policy. The regression model 
is given by:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖+𝛾𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 +∑𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝛿𝑘
𝑘≠𝑝
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where Tit equals the size of the DGME increase assigned to hospital/county h if it was 
granted a cap increase k years ago (or, if k is negative, will receive a cap increase k years 
in the future). The last pretreatment period is represented by p; thus, 𝛿𝑘 represents the 
difference between treatment and control counties/hospitals in period t, with the last 
pretreatment period used as the reference.  The "fixed effect," ai, summarizes the impact 
of permanent differences among hospitals/counties in observed and unobserved 
characteristics. The 𝛾t’s are the coefficients of a set of dummy variables for each year in 
the sample period that capture the general time patterns for each outcome of interest. xit is 
the vector of population covariates corresponding to county/hospital h in year t. All 
analyses at the county level incorporate population covariates related to race, education, 
and poverty from the AHRF.  
 An assumption of the difference-in-differences model requires that treatment and 
control groups experience parallel trends in the outcome variables prior to the policy 
intervention being evaluated. Appendix A uses graphs provide evidence in for parallel 
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trends between the treatment and control hospitals and counties for all outcome measures 
in the analysis. 
Limitations 
 Although CMS published information on which states had not received cap 
increases because they “ran out of slots,” provider numbers for the hospitals under 
consideration in these states were not published online.  Thus, the control group in this 
paper is broader than the true pool of hospitals to which CMS considered allocating GME 
slots, making it a less accurate counterfactual for what would’ve happened to hospitals in 
the control group if they had not received cap increases. 
 Another limitation is the scarcity of pre-treatment data from the AHRF. For 
outcomes like the number of nurse practitioners, which only have two widely-spaced pre-
treatment observations, we can be less certain that parallel trends assumption holds 
between the treatment and control groups. 
 Pre-treatment data is also limited in the Hospital Compare dataset. In recent years, 
CMS has added many clearly-interpretable quality variables to its publicly-available data, 
such as all-patient readmission rates, time from door to discharge, and a new 5-star 
overall quality rating. However, none of these variables appear in the data until after 
2011, making them unusable for this difference-in-differences analysis. The mortality and 
readmissions data that is used instead relates to less-generalizable outcomes about 
critical, but less common health conditions. 
Results 
Effects of the policy on the number of residents 
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Table I summarizes the regression results for outcomes related to the total number 
of residents per county. The coefficients of interest in each regression represent the 
difference in outcomes between the treatment and control counties for each post-
treatment year.  Regression 1 shows a positive relationship between the number of full-
time-equivalent residents and the size of the DGME cap increase; however, this 
correlation is not significantly different form zero until two years after the cap increase, 
at which point a positive and significant relationship emerges. Interestingly, the 
difference-in-differences coefficient exceeds one during the third and fourth years after 
treatment. The 90% confidence interval for these coefficients still overlaps with one (see 
Figure C1 in Appendix C); nonetheless, these results may suggest that an increased GME 
cap causes an increase in medical training beyond the number of residents who are 
trained directly using Medicare funds.  
Regression 2 shows that there is also a positive relationship between the cap 
increase and the number of primary care residents, which is not significant until three 
years after the cap increase. In the last year of available data, four years after the DGME 
cap increase, the coefficient on number of primary care FTEs is 0.591, while the 
coefficient on the total number of FTEs is 1.608. Thus, the impact of the DGME cap 
increase seems to be divided between primary care and specialty positions.  
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TABLE I: NUMBER OF RESIDENTS 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Total FTE Primary care FTE 
   
0 years post-treatment 0.219 -0.0426 
 (0.324) (0.114) 
1 year post-treatment 0.304 -0.0135 
 (0.202) (0.153) 
2 years post-treatment 0.660*** 0.158 
 (0.217) (0.171) 
3 years post-treatment 1.168*** 0.458** 
 (0.307) (0.220) 
4 years post-treatment 1.608*** 0.591** 
 (0.588) (0.274) 
   
Constant 37.59 47.37 
 (66.76) (37.27) 
   
Observations 228 228 
R-squared 0.578 0.407 
Number of FIPS codes 38 38 
Country FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
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Spillovers: general healthcare workforce and quality of care 
Table II shows the regression results for outcomes relating to the general 
healthcare workforce. Regression 1 shows that the change in the number of non-federal 
active MD’s for treatment counties was not statistically different from the change 
experienced by control counties for at least five years after the cap increase. This result is 
consistent with the 2-year lag in the number of residents revealed in Table I, since 
medical residency programs are a minimum of three years in length. Regression 2 shows 
that the change in supply of nurse practitioners for treatment counties was not 
significantly different from the change experienced by control counties for the first four 
years after the policy change; however, by the fifth post-treatment year there had 
emerged a positive and statistically significant relationship, suggesting that every one-
physician increase in the DGME cap is correlated with and 3.6 additional nurse 
practitioners. 
Tables III, IV, and V present regression results on mortality, readmissions, and 
patient satisfaction respectively. There were no statistically significant results on any 
quality measures in the analysis for the first five years after treatment at the hospital 
level. Thus, funding for medical residents seems to have no impact on either the true 
quality of treatment (as observed by patient outcomes for acute myocardial infection, 
heart failure, and pneumonia), nor the perceived quality of treatment (reflected in patient 
satisfaction scores). 
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 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Total active MD's Nurse practitioners 
   
0 years post-treatment -0.779 -0.00764 
 (0.894) (0.277) 
1 year post-treatment -0.998 0.180 
 (0.765) (0.466) 
2 years post-treatment -1.080 0.493 
 (0.793) (0.441) 
3 years post-treatment -0.415 1.012 
 (0.788) (0.614) 
4 years post-treatment 0.0873 1.829** 
 (1.063) (0.844) 
5 years post-treatment 1.868 3.601** 
 (1.230) (1.474) 
Constant -223.0 -1,685*** 
 (199.0) (174.4) 
   
Observations 266 266 
R-squared 0.848 0.895 
Number of FIPS codes 38 38 
Country FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
 
TABLE II. GENERAL HEALTHCARE WORKFORCE  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES AMI adjusted 30 day 
mortality rate 
HF adjusted 30 day 
mortality rate 
PN adjusted 30 day 
mortality rate 
    
3 years pre-treatment 0.000201 -0.000101* 0.000189** 
 (0.000124) (5.90x10-5) (7.27x10-5) 
2 years pre-treatment 2.18x10-5 7.70x10-5 0.000121** 
 (9.25e-05) (5.70x10-5) (5.64e-05) 
0 years post-treatment 6.10x10-5 3.84x10-5 -1.00x10-5 
 (0.000149) (0.000106) (0.000112) 
1 year post-treatment 9.11x10-5 1.65x10-5 -0.000141 
 (0.000149) (0.000104) (0.000118) 
2 years post-treatment 0.000252 9.60x10-5 -0.000166 
 (0.000171) (0.000147) (0.000119) 
3 years post-treatment 0.000218 8.71x10-5 -0.000128 
 (0.000161) (0.000132) (0.000124) 
4 years post-treatment 0.000163 8.52x10-5 0.000116 
 (0.000152) (0.000153) (0.000152) 
5 years post-treatment 0.000103 5.15x10-5 6.36x10-5 
 (0.000149) (9.62x10-5) (0.000135) 
Constant 0.160*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 
 (0.00119) (0.00136) (0.00113) 
    
Observations 809 846 843 
R-squared 0.355 0.077 0.730 
Number of hospitals 88 89 89 
Hospital FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
 
TABLE III: HOSPITAL MORTALITY REGRESSIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES AMI adjusted 30 day readmission rate HF adjusted 30 
day readmission 
rate 
PN adjusted 30 day 
readmission rate 
    
3 years pre-treatment 4.64x10-5 -9.17x10-5 6.25x10-5 
 (0.000113) (0.000146) (0.000158) 
2 years pre-treatment -5.45x10-5 -6.52x10-5 2.60x10-5 
 (9.81x10-5) (0.000103) (0.000117) 
0 years post-treatment 9.93x10-6 8.54x10-5 -2.97x10-5 
 (5.71x10-5) (8.30x10-5) (8.43x10-5) 
1 year post-treatment 9.32x10-5 7.47x10-5 -0.000160 
 (0.000106) (0.000115) (0.000108) 
2 years post-treatment 0.000120 9.24x10-5 -0.000116 
 (0.000136) (0.000159) (0.000127) 
3 years post-treatment 7.52x10-5 5.02x10-6 -5.54x10-5 
 (0.000169) (0.000167) (0.000136) 
4 years post-treatment 5.99x10-5 2.42x10-6 1.43x10-5 
 (0.000174) (0.000176) (0.000145) 
5 years post-treatment -3.26x10-5 -4.83x10-5 -2.31x10-5 
 (0.000158) (0.000178) (0.000139) 
Constant 0.197*** 0.241*** 0.182*** 
 (0.00153) (0.00162) (0.00182) 
    
Observations 706 762 757 
R-squared 0.633 0.459 0.185 
Number of hospitals 82 86 86 
Hospital FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
TABLE IV: HOSPITAL READMISSION REGRESSIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 (1) 
VARIABLES HCAHPS overall score 
  
2 periods pre-treatment -9.71x10-5 
 (0.000420) 
0 periods post-treatment -0.000257 
 (0.000343) 
1 period post-treatment -0.000235 
 (0.000512) 
2 periods post-treatment -8.82x10-5 
 (0.000638) 
3 periods post-treatment -0.000334 
 (0.000762) 
4 periods post-treatment -0.000433 
 (0.000780) 
5 periods post-treatment 0.000116 
 (0.000743) 
Constant 2.464*** 
 (0.0193) 
  
Observations 855 
Number of hospitals 89 
R-squared 0.425 
 
Hospital FE YES 
Year FE YES 
TABLE V: PATIENT SATISFACTION REGRESSIONS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Discussion 
 Despite the enormous public investment in graduate medical education, this paper 
represents one of first empirically based efforts to estimate the impacts of GME-related 
public policy. The results indicated a positive effect of increased Medicare DGME 
funding on the total number of FTE residents, which became significant two years after 
the cap redistribution and continued to increase in years three and four. In the third and 
fourth years after treatment, the coefficient on the total number of FTE residents was 
greater than one, which may suggest that an increased GME cap causes an increase in 
medical training beyond the number of residents who are supported directly using 
Medicare funds.  One possible explanation for this observation is that some hospitals use 
their increased GME funding to create new residency programs, as the creation of a new 
training program activates a 5-year period in which hospitals may earn even more federal 
funding slots. Investigation into the number of distinct residency programs at each 
hospital receiving Medicare DGME funding would contribute to a clearer understanding 
of the relationship between resident caps and the total number of residents.  
 There was also a positive correlation between the cap increase the number of 
primary care residents, which became significant three years after the initial cap 
redistribution. While this increase in the number of primary care residents seems 
consistent with CMS’s public goal of utilizing GME funding to increase the supply of 
primary care physicians, the analysis of a 2005 residency redistribution by Chen et al 
(2013) warns us to interpret this result with caution. A simple increase in the number of 
primary care physicians does not constitute the necessary shift in the distribution of 
medical specialties that is necessary to meet our nation’s healthcare needs. In order to 
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ameliorate current disparities and prevent future deficits in healthcare access, a greater 
proportion of physicians must choose to go into primary care.  
 The results of this paper, which revealed a sizeable difference between the 
coefficients on total number of FTE’s and number of primary care FTE’s, suggest that the 
number of additional medical residents entering specialty programs was at least as large 
as the increase in the number of primary care residents. The relative growth of primary 
versus nonprimary residencies among hospitals who receive increased DGME funding 
should be examined further in future research. Future research should also examine the 
likelihood of primary care physicians, relative to specialty physicians, practicing in the 
geographic area where they completed their residencies. Will more primary care 
physicians (versus specialty physicians) that were trained using Section 5503-related 
funds choose to practice locally, since the policy aimed to increase funding in areas with 
a high demand for these positions? This question can not be answered with the current 
data, but it is important for analyzing the perceived effectiveness of GME redistribution 
policies in addressing geographic health inequities. 
 Future research should also test for a relationship between total number of active 
MDs and DGME caps over a longer time horizon. This paper showed that hospitals who 
receive increased DGME slots typically require on adjustment period of up to two years 
before they even begin approaching their new cap. Since medical residencies take a 
minimum of three years, the time window for this study was simply too short to observe 
overall changes in county-level physician supply as a result of residents choosing to 
practice locally after completing their training. Further insight into the frequency with 
which primary care and specialty physicians choose to practice locally, as well as the 
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long-term effects of an expanded medical residency program on the local physician labor 
market, will give policymakers better information on how DGME funding effects the 
market for healthcare as a whole. 
 This paper also presents the first known results relating DGME funding to non-
physician healthcare occupations and finds a positive (though lagged) correlation 
between DGME caps and the number of registered nurses. The increase in the number of 
registered nurses became significant within three years of the cap redistribution, and 
indicated an increase of nearly four registered nurses for every additional DGME slot. 
The observed spillover effect on the number of registered nurses demonstrates that 
federal funding for DGME can have consequences for the healthcare labor market that 
extend beyond the supply of certified physicians. The effect of DGME funding on the 
supply of clinical support staff should be considered by future policymakers who wish to 
leverage federal GME funding as a tool to create a more efficiently-distributed healthcare 
workforce. 
 Although previous research has suggested that medical residents perform better 
than fully-trained physicians on some measures of quality, this paper found no significant 
effect of DGME funding on actual (measured using mortality/readmissions data) or 
perceived (measured using patient satisfaction surveys) quality of care. Nevertheless, 
future research may yield more precise results on the relationship between medical 
residency counts and hospital quality using the more comprehensive data that is currently 
available through Hospital Compare.  
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY STATISTICS   
 Control Treatment 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max N mean sd min max 
           
% White 14 77.65 15.93 29.10 94 24 65.80 18.29 28.40 96.10 
% Black 14 13.01 17.39 0.600 69.40 24 24.44 19.82 0.200 69.10 
Native American 14 0.771 0.718 0.200 2.200 24 0.871 1.213 0.200 4.800 
% Other race 14 4.436 3.516 0.200 12.80 24 3.775 3.972 0.600 16 
% Two+ races 14 2.250 0.930 0.700 4 24 2.392 1.081 0.500 5.100 
%Hispanic/Latino 14 13.74 10.01 0.700 32.40 24 13.52 15.86 1.500 65 
% Less than HS 
education 
14 13.33 4.937 7.500 25.80 24 12.11 3.070 6.900 19.40 
% HS education 
or above 
14 86.67 4.937 74.20 92.50 24 87.89 3.070 80.60 93.10 
% College 
educated 
14 25.48 9.478 11.50 41.50 24 30.64 8.445 11.50 55.40 
Total population 14 546,553 989,390 14,972 3.817x106 24 686,364 637,873 34,690 2.496x106 
Poverty rate 14 18.06 6.119 9.800 35.60 24 17.88 4.242 11.70 27.10 
Average per 
capita income 
14 34,165 5,116 25,801 42,273 24 38,764 8,443 28,640 70,710 
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APPENDIX B: PARALLEL TRENDS 
FIGURE B1. Parallel trends graph for the total number of active MD’s at the county 
level. Source: AHRF 
FIGURE B2. Parallel trend graph for total number of nurse practitioners at the county 
level. Source: AHRF 
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FIGURE B3. Parallel trend graph for total number of primary care full-time-equivalent 
medical residents at the county level. Source: CMS Cost Reports/Robert Graham Center 
 
FIGURE B4. Parallel trend graph for Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare 
Providers and Systems survey overall patient score. Source: CMS Hospital Compare 
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FIGURE B5. Parallel trend graph for acute myocardial infection mortality and 
readmission. Source: CMS Hospital Compare 
FIGURE B6. Parallel trend graph for heart failure mortality and readmission. Source: 
CMS Hospital Compare 
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FIGURE B7.  Parallel trend graph for pneumonia failure mortality and readmission. 
Source: CMS Hospital Compare 
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APPENDIX C: RESIDENT COUNT EVENT STUDIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE C1. Event study plot for county-level number of full-time-equivalent residents 
(Panel A) and primary care FTE’s (Panel B). Plotted coefficients represent results from 
Table I. Bars represent 90% confidence interval. 
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APPENDIX D: HEALTHCARE WORKFORCE EVENT STUDIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE D1. Event study plot for county-level number level number of total active MD’s 
(Panel A) and nurse practitioners (Panel B) Plotted coefficients represent results from 
Table II. Bars represent 90% confidence interval. 
